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The paper examines the spillover and linkage effects from the presence of foreign firms in 
the Indian pharmaceutical industry. A comprehensive panel data consisting of nearly 200 
firms from 1989 to 2000 was used in the current study. The recent semi-parametric 
estimation methods as suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
were adopted to account for the endogeneity in the input demand. Our results suggest the 
existence of positive and significant spillover from the foreign equity ownership in the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry. However, we also found negative and significant spillovers from 
the backward linkages with foreign firms. The negative spillovers from the backward 
linkages suggest the possibility of large technology and efficiency gap between local and 
foreign firms. The results also suggest that institutional arrangements that protect intellectual 
property rights such as product patents as opposed to process patents will be important for 
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 1. Introduction 
Recent evidence suggests that India is increasingly becoming an important destination 
for FDI in Asia, where India's share in world FDI has been steadily increasing from 0.17% in 
2000 to 0.53% in 2002, in line with the progressive liberalization in the FDI policy by the 
Indian government (World Investment Report, 2003). In fact, the progressive liberalization 
that was undertaken since 1990 has strengthened investor confidence and increased the FDI 
flows into various new sectors like integrated townships, defense, telecommunications, 
pharmaceutical etc. These reforms and deregulation in key sectors to foreign competition and 
ownership is expected to create strong economic benefits and externalities to the Indian 
economy through spillovers from multinational activities, thereby resulting in domestic firms 
becoming more productive and competitive.  
With the growing importance of FDI, most host countries including India are not only 
seeking more of foreign investments, but are also interested in the technology and 
distributional networks of the multinational companies, which are the key propriety assets of 
the foreign firms. Although it is expected that the multinational firms will internalize the 
returns of these propriety assets, the activities of the foreign affiliates in the domestic 
economy has certain public good qualities that cannot be internalized. Multinational activities 
could create externalities and spillovers onto the domestic economy through ownership 
structures,  enhancing domestic competition, transfer technology through imitation or reverse 
engineering, training of local entrepreneurs and workers, and establishing production and 
distributional linkages in the domestic economy (Dimelis and Louri, 2002; Gorg and 
Greenaway, 2002). 
  1However, it not always the case that the domestic firms benefits from the activities of 
foreign firms, as the relative backwardness of the industrial structure and the institutional 
characteristics of the domestic economy significantly determines the relative size and extent 
of the spillovers (Glass and Saggi, 1998; Grima et al, 2001). In this paper, we examine if 
such linkages and spillovers exist from the multinational activities on the domestic firms in 
the Indian pharmaceutical industry.  
One way to understand the complimentary benefits between multinational activities 
and local industrial capabilities is to examine the production linkages of foreign and domestic 
firms. Backward linkages occur when foreign affiliates acquire goods or services from 
domestic firms, and conversely, the forward linkages are formed when foreign affiliates sell 
their goods and services to domestic firms. By generating markets for indigenous firms 
through upstream and downstream linkages, foreign firms are able to develop products more 
successfully in the same or related industrial sector. 
Foreign affiliates like any other firm have three options in obtaining inputs in a host 
country: imports, local in-house production, or procure them from a local or foreign supplier. 
The extent to which foreign affiliate forges linkages with domestic suppliers is determined by 
balance of costs and benefits, which is determined by the availability of efficient local 
suppliers. The lack of efficient domestic suppliers is often the key obstacle to the creation of 
local linkages. In order to sustain the quality standards in their production, multinational 
firms actively encourage foreign suppliers to establish local facilities or prefer to produce the 
required inputs in house. 
There is a vast empirical literature that investigates if there are any spillovers from 
foreign affiliates to the host economy or if they operate in “enclave sectors” with no links to 
  2the domestic economy (sees the surveys by Blomstrom et. al, 2000; Gorg and Greenaway, 
2002). Most empirical studies tend to use labour productivity or total factor productivity of 
domestic firms as an independent variable and regress on a range of dependent variables. The 
proxies for “intra-sectoral” spillovers such as the share of foreign affiliates’ employment or 
sales to total industrial activities were used as dependent variable to capture the activities of 
the MNCs in the domestic economy.  
There is no general conclusion as to the effect or the extent of the spillovers from the 
activities of the foreign firms to the domestic firms or economy. Although, several empirical 
studies based on cross-sectional and industry level study suggest positive linkage and 
spillover effects from multinational activity in the host economy, more recent firm level 
evidence suggests negative spillovers from the presence of the foreign firms (Aitken and 
Harrison, 1999; Djankov and Hockman, 2000). In fact, these empirical evidences mostly 
suggest that the host country’s industrial structure and the type of multinational activities 
affect the effectiveness of the backward linkages in the host country (Girma, Greenaway, and 
Wakelin, 2001; Kokko et al. 1996).  
There are several recent empirical studies at the firm level that directly deal with 
backward linkages and multinational activities. Using firm level data for Venezuela, Aitken 
and Harrison (1999) failed to find any spillovers from multinational activities on domestic 
firms in the same region, although they found negative spillovers from multinationals located 
in the same sector. Girma and Wakelin (2000) found evidence of positive spillovers from 
multinational activities to domestic firms in the same sector in UK industries. Görg and 
Strobl (2002) in a study of the manufacturing industries of Ireland show a rather large effect 
of multinational activity in downstream sectors on entry of Irish firms in upstream sectors 
  1and across a variety of industries. However, they also conclude that other indicators such as 
employment effects in upstream sectors are necessary in order to render stronger conclusions 
about the linkage effects of multinational firms in the Irish economy. In a recent study, 
Smarzynska (2002) estimates the backward linkages for a variety of Lithuanian industries 
and show that there are positive spillovers from the multinational activities to domestic firms 
in sectors downstream, but not with the presence of multinationals in the same sector. 
Furthermore, the study on Lithuania reveals that linkages appear stronger in a localized 
perspective, e.g. proximity between users and producers do matter to the externality effect. 
This study also shows that local market-seekers may have stronger linkage effects than the 
more export oriented multinational firms.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the presence of spillovers and linkages 
stemming from the activities of foreign firms in the Indian pharmaceutical industry. The 
Indian pharmaceutical industry stands out of all other industries to examine industrial 
structure and the impact of foreign activities on the domestic economy. The pharmaceutical 
industry is one of the key industries that are affected by the current liberalization of the 
Indian economy. In 1970s, the government enacted the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 
(FERA) to reduce the foreign ownership in domestic industries, which required domestic 
firms to reduce their foreign equity ownership to less than 40% so as to quality for the 
economic incentives as domestic firms.  This led to a drastic reduction in the share of foreign 
collaborations and multinational activities in the pharmaceutical industry (Keayla, 1998). In 
1994, under the economic liberalization, the Indian government allowed the foreign equity 
ownership to increase to 51% of the domestic companies. During the same year, under open 
general licence, the government also announced the removal of the restrictions on the imports 
  2of almost all foreign drugs into the domestic economy. Both these initiatives let many firms 
to increase their foreign equity ownership in the pharmaceutical industry (GOI Annual 
Report 1997-98).  
However, the full impact of the economic liberalization through the flow of FDI is 
not felt directly by the Indian pharmaceutical industry, since there is a large pharmaceutical 
industry in India that is largely based on reverse engineering on existing drugs, which 
directly affects the production relationship between domestic and foreign firms. This will 
allow us to address the institutional framework such as intellectual property rights that could 
directly affect the types of activities multinational companies will undertake in the domestic 
economy. Given that the Indian government only provides patent protection for 
pharmaceutical processes and not on products, there is a large industry that is based on 
reverse engineering on the existing or newly introduced drugs (Kremer, 2002). This lack of 
protection not only dampens FDI flow into the industry, but also hampers any R&D activities 
undertaken by existing foreign firms in the host country.  Nicholas, Merind, Roche and 
Searle (GOI Annual Report 1993-94) highlights that the pricing system, lack of patents, and 
disadvantages in entering into licensing with local firms are the key reasons for the 
disinvestments in the Indian pharmaceutical sector.  
Using a panel of nearly 200 firms from 1989 to 2000, the paper examines the impact 
of multinational activities on the Indian pharmaceutical industry. Recent studies highlights 
the biasness of industry and cross-sectional studies as they do not control for time-specific 
productivity differences across industries and sectors, which might be correlated with factors 
other than that of the foreign affiliate activities (see Gorg and Greenaway, 2002). The panel 
data estimation, on the other hand, allows us to control for unobservable firms effects that 
  3enable us to identify the spillover effects from multinational activities. The semi-parametric 
estimation methodologies as suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) that accounts for endogeneity of input demand are employed in the current study. 
More specifically, we control for unobserved firm heterogeneity and also account for the 
endogeneity in the input selection with respect to productivity, which allows for consistent 
estimates of the production function
2.  
Our results suggest the existence of positive and significant spillover from foreign 
equity ownership in the Indian pharmaceutical industry. However, we found negative 
spillovers from the backward linkages between foreign and domestic firms. This suggests 
that full foreign ownership results in negative externalities to domestic firms in downstream 
sectors in the pharmaceutical industry. The negative spillovers from the backward linkages 
suggest the possibility of large technology and efficiency gap between local and foreign 
firms in the Indian pharmaceutical industry.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. The sources of the data and estimation 
methodologies are given in section 2 and 3 respectively. In Section 4, we report the results. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Data 
The data set used in the present study is from the Center for monitoring Indian 
economy (CMIE) database. The firm level data constitute an unbalanced panel from 1989-
2000. The sample consists of a total of 192 firms that includes 176 domestic and 16 foreign 
affiliated firms. Foreign firms are distinguished from their domestic counterpart on the basis 
of its share of ownership of the firm, where ownership share of more than 25 percent is 
                                                 
2 Griliches and Maireses (1998) have argued that inputs should be considered endogenous since they are chosen 
by a firm based on its productivity, which is observed by the producer but not by the econometrician. Not taking 
into account the endogeneity of input choices biases the estimated production function coefficients.  
  4considered as foreign affiliated firms. All the variables used in the estimation are measured at 
constant 1990-91 prices.  
The total value of output is taken to be the output variable in this study. The total raw 
materials consumed by the firms are deflated by the weighted input price index. The material 
price index is a weighted index of wholesale prices of major input groups, where the weights 
were calculated from the matrix of Input-Output Tables published by Central Statistical 
Organization (CSO). The value of the output and material input is taken from Annual Survey 
of Industry (ASI), various issues. The input-output transaction matrix (1978-79 and 1983-84) 
is used to construct the price deflators. The capital stock is defined by the value of tangible 
fixed assets and it is deflated using the capital stock deflator. The series on the number of 
workers is constructed using data from ASI using the data on total wages and salaries of the 
firms. 
  The key variables in our study are the horizontal (HRZ) and backward (BACK) 
linkages from the presence of foreign firms. The horizontal linkage (HORZ) variable 
captures the impact of foreign equity ownership and the benefits it delivers to local firms.  
The HORZ is defined as foreign equity participation averaged over all firms in the sector, 
weighted by each firm’s share in sectoral output
3. It is given as: 










     (1), 
where   is defined as the share of foreign equity in firm i at time t and   represents 
share of output in firm i at time t. The HORZ variable is positively related to the output of 
the foreign firms and with the share of foreign capital in the domestic firms. We could 
it FS it Y
                                                 
3 The above definition is similar to Smarzynska (2000), which uses output as weights. In contrast, employment 
was used as weights by Aitken and Harrison (1999).  
  5interpret the HORZ the degree of quality control and screening that foreign firms impose on 
the domestic firms through their equity ownership. In contrast, the backward linkage (Back) 
variable intends to capture the level of interactions between domestic suppliers and 
multinationals. It is defined as the share of local raw material expenditures by local firms to 
total raw material expenditures of foreign firms weighted by the sales ratio of the respective 











Back *      (2), 
where  denotes expenditures incurred on local raw material by local firm i at time t 
and  denotes the total raw materials expenditures of all foreign firms. The 
backward linkage variable indicates the degree of linkage and spillovers that exist from the 
procurement activities undertaken by the foreign firms, as BACK increases with the 
procurement of local raw materials by the foreign firms. The backward linkage variable also 
reflects the domestic capacity and efficiency of local firms, where inefficient local suppliers 
could possibly lower the local procurement of raw materials by the foreign firms. In this 
case, foreign firms will create less backward linkage and increase their dependence on 
external market for their raw materials. 
it LRAWM
∑ j jt FRAWM
We summarize the key activities of domestic and foreign firms in Table 1. The 
average R&D expenditure in the Indian pharmaceutical industry is found to be very low, 
which is hardly one percent of the total sales of the whole industry. In fact, it is quite clear 
that most of the R&D activities are driven by foreign firms and the average R&D intensity of 
the foreign firms is much higher than the local firms, where the average R&D intensity of 
foreign firms is nearly 0.35 as compared to 0.30 for the domestic firms in 1990-2000. In fact, 
  6the increase in R&D intensity for the local firms is only observed after the relaxation of 
foreign equity share to 51 percent in 1994. Recent trends suggest that the R&D intensity is 
increasing for local firms as they start to build-up their own research capabilities to compete 
with foreign firms.  
 
              Table 1: The Trend of the Key Variables for the Foreign and Domestic Firms  
                                     in Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, 1990-2000. 
   (W/S)*100  Export-Intensity  Tech. Import Intensity  R&D intensity 
Year Foreign Domestic Foreign  Domestic Foreign Domestic  Foreign  Domestic 
1990-
1993  11.40  11.41  5.00 8.80 0.22  0.49  0.23 0.11 
1994-
1996  10.35  9.13 6.11 11.92  0.32  2.56  0.44 0.25 
1997-
2000  10.85  10.78 8.73  15.66 0.93  0.77  0.39  0.54 
Note: (W/S)*100 – Share of wages to total sales of the firm, Export-Intensity: Share of exports to total sales of 
the firm, R&D Intensity: Share of (foreign) R&D expenditure to total sales of the firm, Tech. Import Intensity: 
share of import of capital goods plus remittances on royalty and technical fees to total sales of the firm 
 
  It is generally assumed that the foreign firms are more export oriented than their 
domestic counterparts because of their easy access to the global distribution networks, 
product quality, brand names, patents and other firm-specific comparative advantages. 
However, the evidence in Table 1 suggests that there is an opposite trend as the average 
export intensity of the domestic firms is consistently higher than that of the foreign firms. 
Since the post reform period of 1994, the average export intensity of both domestic and 
foreign firms is observed to be rising two to three folds as compared to pre-1994 period, 
which suggests that the Indian pharmaceutical industry is becoming more export-oriented in 
the global market. 
  Import of technology is an important determinant of the productivity growth for the 
domestic firms. It can be measured by the import of capital goods plus remittances on 
account of royalty and technical fees as a proportion of sales. The average technology import 
  7as given in Table 1 is much higher than that of the foreign firms, which indicates the reliance 
of local firms to upgrade their technology through technology imports than foreign firms in 
the industry. Due to greater economic liberalization of imports, the technology imports seem 
to have increased after the policy changes in 1994 to remove import restrictions. Policy to 
reduce price controls, liberalize import, and scraping of various production control measures 
seems to have positive impact on efforts of the domestic firms to keep pace with the R&D 
activities of the foreign firms. This is expected to be a positive trend in the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry.  
3. Empirical Model 
The estimation framework adopted here is similar to Smarzynska (2002). The Cobb 
Douglas production is defined to study the relationship between local firm productivity and 
foreign presence in the domestic market. Thus firm i’s production is given as: 
it i t it it it it it it Horz Back M L K Y ε α α β β β β β + + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 ln ln ln ln    (3), 
where subscripts i and   refer to firm and time respectively.      and  represent 
the log of output, capital, labour and material inputs respectively. 
t it Y it it L K , it M
t α  and  i α  capture time 
and firm specific effects respectively.  
The above model is estimated using Ordinary Least Square Method (OLS) with time 
and fixed effects. However, there are two major shortcomings in the OLS estimation. The 
key shortcoming is that it does not take account of the unobserved firm characteristics, such 
as managerial talent, availability of better infrastructure or access to financing that could 
driving some of the changes in the productivity of the firm. To address this issue, we re-
estimate our model as a panel with firm fixed effects, which allow one to control for time 
invariant determinants of productivity across firms that are also potentially correlated with 
  8ownership variables. Following Haskel et. al. (2002), we also used time differencing as well 
as a full set of fixed effects to address the above firm specific effects. Thus our specification 
is given as: 
it t it it it it it it Horz Back M l K Y ε α δ δ δ δ δ ∆ + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ 5 4 3 2 1 ln ln ln ln         (3a) 
However, the estimation of the production function in differences still poses another 
problem. The estimation of equation (1a) may not be appropriate, since it treats labor and 
other inputs as strictly exogenous variables. As observed by Griliches and Mairesse (1998) 
that the key essence of the simultaneity problem is that the firm specific effects are only 
observable by the firm thereby affecting their choice of the levels of the inputs, but not 
otherwise observable and accounted by the data. In this case, the unobserved firm specific 
effects might be correlated with the inputs of the production function and thereby bias the 
estimated coefficients. To account for the simultaneity problem, we employ the recently 
developed semi-parametric estimation procedures of Olley and Pakes (1996) (henceforth 
Olley-Pakes), which was further extended by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (henceforth 
Levinsohn-Petrin). The summary of Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn and Petrin is given in the 
appendix. 
  A production function accounting for Olley-Pakes correction is estimated and from 
the results, we recover the measure of total factor productivity. Based on the derived total 
factor productivity, the final model estimated is given as: 
it t i it it it Back Horz TFP ε α α β β α + + + + + = 2 1 ln      (3b) 
It is important to note that the Olley-Pakes procedure is based on the assumption of 
factors fully adjusting to shocks in each period and markets being perfectly competitive. 
Levinsohn-Petrin argues that investment as used by Olley-Pakes does not fully control for 
  9simultaneity problem and suggested the advantages of using materials inputs to identify the 
unobservable productivity. They highlight that intermediate inputs respond to the entire 
productivity term, whereas investment may only partially respond to the “news” in the 
unobserved term. The Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn and Petrin method are used to estimate 
firm specific total factor productivity, and then it is used as the dependent variable in OLS 
estimation of equation (3b).  
4. Estimation Results 
The results from OLS (with White’s correction of standard errors), fixed effect, 
Olley-Pakes, and Levinsohn-Petrin methods are given in Table 2 and 3. In Table 2A, the 
OLS estimation reveals that HORZ is positive and the backward linkage variable, BACK, is 
negative. Given the biasness in the OLS estimation, we re-estimate the model with fixed, 
Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-Petrin methods. The results are given in Table 2A and 2B. 
The results are robust to the alternative estimation methodologies. The fixed effects 
estimation given in column3 of Table 2A suggests positive and significant horizontal 
spillovers from the activities of foreign affiliates. The result is also robust to the estimation of 
both Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-Petrin methodologies as given in Table 2B. The implication 
of this result is that domestic firms tend to have benefited from the presence of foreign 
companies through foreign equity ownership. It points to the fact that foreign firms transfer 
new technologies and invest more productive resources in the production of their own 
affiliates, and hence foreign affiliates represent greater potential for spillovers. The positive 
impact of HORZ also reflects that foreign participation acts as possible quality control and 
screening of the domestic firm production through equity ownership. 
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Table 2A: OLS and Fixed Effects Estimation for Indian Pharmaceutical Industry: 1989-2000 (All Firms) 
 OLS  Fixed  Effects 
 Level  First  Difference   
K 0.083**  0.008*  0.021* 
 (4.04)  (1.98)  (1.99) 
      
M 0.839***  0.806***  0.846*** 
 (37.9)  (14.5)  (17.7) 
      
L 0.116**  0.174**  0.149** 
 (5.44)  (4.29)  (3.71) 
      
Backward -1.132**  -1.335**  -1.491** 
 (-4.61)  (-2.79)  (-2.81) 
      
Horizontal 3.991**  6.138**  3.788** 
 (3.83)  (3.38)  (4.33) 
      
Constant 0.565**  -0.0003  0.844** 
 (3.56)  (-0.125)  (3.10) 
      
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
Adj. R squared  0.97  0.84  0.98 
      
Obs. 1504  1316 1504
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
t-vales are reported in the parenthesis. 
 
The backward linkage variable is negative and robust to alternative estimations, 
which suggest that the procurement activities of foreign firms tend to reduce the productive 
performance of local firms. To establish robustness of the results, we also re-estimated the 
model with only domestic firms to remove the dominant effects of large foreign firms in the 
sample. The results are given in Table 3A and 3B. Again, we do observe the negative effects 
of the backward linkage and the result is also supported by the Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-
Petrin estimations. Further, as in the previous estimation, we also find positive impact of 
foreign equity ownership on domestic firms supporting the evidence that foreign 
participation through ownership structures will have positive impact on the domestic firms. 
  11Table 2B: Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-Petrin Estimation for Indian Pharmaceutical Industry:  
1989-2000 (All Firms) 
 Olley-Pakes  Levinsohn-Petrin 
 OLS  First 
Difference 
OLS First  Difference 
Backward -0.463*  -0.583**  -0.093*  -0.039** 
 (-5.10)  (-2.70)  (-5.23)  (-2.84) 
        
Horizontal 1.841*  2.749*  0.386*  0.247** 
 (7.88) (5.88)  (8.35)  (4.28) 
        
Constant 1.469*  0.073  3.94**  -0.03** 
 (8.63) (0.798)  (2.23)  (-2.00) 
        
Year 
Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
Adj. R 
squared  0.34 0.25  0.34  0.25 
        
Obs. 1218  1039 1218 1039
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
t-vales are reported in the parenthesis. 
 
Table 3A: OLS and Fixed Effects Estimation for Indian Pharmaceutical Industry: 1989-2000 (Domestic Firms) 
 OLS  Fixed  Effects 
 Level  First  Difference   
K 0.094**  0.019**  0.018** 
 (4.24)  (2.32)  (2.34) 
      
M 0.838***  0.815***  0.847*** 
 (37.6)  (14.6)  (17.2) 
      
L 0.104**  0.173**  0.149** 
 (4.65)  (4.22)  (3.48) 
      
Backward -1.505**  -1.459*  -1.412* 
 (-3.61)  (-1.72)  (-1.85) 
      
Horizontal 3.418**  4.719**  3.347** 
 (3.28)  (2.51)  (3.32) 
      
Constant 0.512**  -0.007  0.898* 
 (3.18)  (-0.98)  (2.91) 
      
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
Adj. R squared  0.97  0.84  0.98 
      
Obs. 1331  1159 1331
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
t-vales are reported in the parenthesis. 
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Table 3B: Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-Petrin Estimation for Indian Pharmaceutical Industry:  
1989-2000 (Domestic Firms) 
 Olley-Pakes  Levinsohn-Petrin 
 OLS  First 
Difference 
OLS First  Difference 
Backward -1.52*  -1.291*  -0.863*  -0.408** 
 (-1.84)  (-1.62)  (-5.24)  (-2.77) 
        
Horizontal 1.153  1.724*  0.369*  0.256* 
 (1.07) (2.21)  (8.06)  (4.09) 
        
Constant -11.248*  0.04  3.75**  -0.03* 
 (-1.94)  (1.19)  (2.21)  (1.61) 
        
Year 
Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
Adj. R 
squared  0.31 0.020  0.30  0.19 
        
Obs. 1068  898  1068 898
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
t-vales are reported in the parenthesis. 
 
  The negative backward linkage result tends to be very interesting in our study. 
Consider the effect of backward linkage as a measure of vertical spillovers, the effect of 
foreign presence on down stream firms. We observe negative and statistically significant 
coefficient associated with backward linkage (BACK) variable, which was also observed in 
other firm level studies (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Djankov and Hockman, 2000). The 
result is also robust to alternation estimation by Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-Petrin. The 
observation of the negative sign can be explained as follows. Firstly, the technology and 
efficiency gap between local and foreign firms might be too large for domestic firms to 
benefit fully from the production activities of foreign firms. The foreign investors entering a 
host country is less likely to source for domestic resources if the production capacity of the 
local firms is weak. Due to the fact that the foreign firms face higher costs of finding efficient 
  13and reliable local suppliers, foreign firms are more inclined to integrate their production 
operations of their subsidiaries with supply network of the parent company. Thus domestic 
firms could only benefit from multinational activities if the technology and efficiency gap is 
not too large between local and foreign firms that allow local firms to absorb the spillover of 
knowledge from the multinationals (Kokko et. al., 1996). In the case of Indian 
pharmaceutical industry, there might be country specific factors such as limited patent 
protection that might have contributed to the negative backward linkage and foreign firms 
might be operating as “enclaves” with little interaction with local firms. Given that there is 
already a large reverse engineering activities on existing drugs by the domestic firms in the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry due limited or non-existence of patent protections on 
products, the enclave activities might be preemptive strategies by the foreign firms to reduce 
the flow of technologies to down stream local firms and to protect their firm-specific 
technology. 
  The technology gap between local and foreign firms is also observable from derived 
total factor productivity (TFP) from our estimation. The total factor productivity growth 
measure based on the Olley-Pakes estimation is given in Table 4. Comparing the total factor 
productivity (TFP) of domestic and foreign firms in the Indian pharmaceutical industry over 
the period of study, we may observe that foreign firms tend to have higher productivity 
growth than domestic firms in the Indian pharmaceutical industry. Interestingly, we observe a 
reversal in the trend in post 1996 period, after the policy announcement on the increase in 
foreign equity investment, thereby supporting the observation that domestic firms were 
protected from foreign competition. Over this period of 1996 to 2000, foreign firms reported 
positive TFPG of around 1.3 percent as compared to the domestic firms with a negative 
  14TFPG of around 1.1 percent. The declining productivity growth for the local firm from 1996 
suggests that local firms are protected and more backward with regard to their technologies 
as compared to the foreign firms, which also supports the evidence of negative backward 
linkages. 
Table 4: TFP Growth of Foreign & Domestic Firms In  
Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, 1990-2000 (%) 
Year Foreign  Domestic 
1990-1993 4.9  3.5 
1994-1996 1.3  -1.1 
1997-2000 1.4  -0.5 
Note: TFPG is derived from Olley-Pakes estimation. 
   
The overall results suggest that there are positive spillovers from the activities of 
foreign firms in the Indian pharmaceutical industry since the spillover from foreign 
ownership through equity holdings is larger than the negative impact from the backward 
linkage. However, as domestic firms face greater economic liberalization from foreign 
ownership and competition, productivity gap tends to widen between the local and foreign 
firms. The future growth of the Indian pharmaceutical industry depends critically on reducing 
the productivity and technology gap between local and foreign firms and for the 
pharmaceutical industry to benefit from the presence of foreign firms in terms of linkages 
and spillovers.  
6. Conclusions and Policy implications 
The paper investigated the spillover and linkage effects from the activities of foreign 
firms on the local firms in Indian pharmaceutical industry. The results suggest that foreign 
ownership through equity holdings has positive spillovers on the productive performance of 
local firms. However, we also found that the impact of foreign ownership depends on how 
closely the foreign firms integrate their operations with the local production chain through 
  15their procurement activities. The effects of the procurement or the backward linkage indicate 
negative spillovers between local and foreign firms. The negative backward linkages between 
local and foreign firms suggest that there is a large technology and efficiency gap between 
local and foreign firms. The overall results suggest that there are positive spillovers from the 
activities of foreign firms in the Indian pharmaceutical industry as the effects of equity 
ownership are greater than the negative impact of the backward linkage. However, the future 
growth of the pharmaceutical industry still depends in narrowing their technology and 
efficiency gap between local and foreign firms.  
The results suggest several policy implications to enhance the productivity growth of 
local firms with foreign participation in the Indian pharmaceutical industry. The results 
suggest that foreign equity participation has improved productivity of the domestic 
pharmaceutical industry, and further liberalization of the FDI policy in terms of foreign 
ownership will have positive impact on the industry. However, there should also be policy to 
strengthen the local linkage of FDI through specific tools and incentives to address the 
problems of high cost, poor quality and unreliability associated with local suppliers. This is 
essentially to encourage local suppliers to respond efficiently to the demand of foreign firms, 
which in turn depend upon supply network, support institutions, development of local skills 
and technological capabilities. Further, there should be incentives for domestic firms to 
develop their own in-house R&D capabilities so as to build indigenous technological 
capabilities.  
The results of the paper also highlights that institutional arrangements such as giving 
protection for Intellectual Property Rights might be very crucial for attracting and creating 
linkages from the activities of foreign firms in the host country. One of the key obstacles for 
  16the Indian pharmaceutical industry is the absence of patent protection for their products. 
Clearly, the intellectual property environment in a country affects the flow of foreign 
investment, particularly in those industries heavily dependent on intellectual property 
protection. India is unique among developing countries, since India has a thriving 
pharmaceutical industry dedicated to providing healthcare at the lowest possible cost. 
India’s pharmaceutical industry growth has been primarily driven by its strength in 
production of generic drugs. This has been possible because Indian laws have been based on 
protecting process rather than product innovations. India’s pharmaceutical industry has 
grown in scale, and recent years it is beginning to generate patentable intellectual capital. It 
has resources to make selective acquisition of firms abroad; and to make tentative moves 
towards branded drugs. It will be important to observe the changes in the intellectual 
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  19Appendix 
 
A1:  Olley and Pakes Correction 
Olley-Pakes method allows for firm specific productivity differences that exhibit 
idiosyncratic changes over time and thus addresses the simultaneity bias. The key innovation 
of Olley-Pakes is to proxy for the unobservable firm specific effects and thus introduces a 
new investment equation into the analysis. To illustrate the insights of the methodology, we 
start with the following production function.  
it it it k it l it it it k l m y va η ω β β α + + + + = − = * *    (A1) 
where iand  are subscripts denoting firm and time and   is value added i.e., (output minus 
material inputs), l is for labour,   is for capital, and respectively. All of the above variables 
are in logs. Capital is treated as a fixed input while labor and materials are assumed to be 
freely variable inputs. Additionally, the error term
t va
k
it ε  is assumed to be additively separable in 
two components, a transmitted component,  it ω , and an i.i.d component, ηit . The key 
difference between  it ω  and  it η is that the former is a state variable, and hence impacts the 
firm’s decision rules, while latter has no impact on the firm’s decision. In other words,  it η  
represents the error term capturing the unpredictable shocks, while  it ω  represents a 
productivity shock which is unobserved by the econometrician but known to the firm. Firms 
adjust their variable inputs based on their anticipation or knowledge of the productivity shock 
it ω
4. Since there exists a correlation between the error term it ε  i.e., () it it η ω +  and 
explanatory variables, a simple OLS will lead to inconsistent estimate of  the regression 
model. In a perfectly competitive environment where input and output prices are common 
across firms, the capital investment can be written as just a function of two state variables, 
 and  it k it ω  or we can express it as  
( t t t t k i i , ) ω =         ( A 2 )  
Olley-Pakes shows that under certain conditions that optimizing firms choosing to 
invest tend to have investment functions that are strictly increasing in the unobserved 
productivity shock. In our model, this assumption might be appropriate as the removal of 
foreign ownership and imports tariffs by the Indian government is expected to increase the 
investment in new technologies in capital goods such as plants, equipments and buildings.  
By inverting equation (A2), we can express unobserved productivity  it ω as a function 
of observable investment and capital and thus we can control for  it ω in estimation. We can 
express the equation as follows. 
( t t it k i , ) φ ω =         ( A 3 )  
Given this monotonicity condition, we can rewrite equation (A1) as: 
( ) it it it it k it l it it it k i k l m y va η φ β β α + + + + = − = , * *  (A4) 
                                                 
4 The major innovation of Olley-Pakes is to bring a new equation, the invest equation, as a proxy for ω , the 
unobserved transmitted component of ε . Trying to proxy for the unobserved ω has several advantages over 
the usual within estimators or the more general Chamberlin and GMM type estimators. It does not assume that 
ω reduces to a “fixed” (over time) effect and it leaves more identifying variance in x and k. Hence it is a less 
costly solution to the omitted variable and/or simultaneity problem and it should also be substantively more 
informative (Griliches and Mairesse, 1998). 
  20It must be highlighted that the functional form of  () . φ  is not known. Thus, Olley-Pakes 
suggest using a two-stage approach to estimate  () . φ . In the first stage, a semi parametric 
estimator (non parametric in  t φ ) can be used to obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients 
on the freely variable inputs. We estimate the partially linear model using a polynomial in 
capital and investment to approximate the functional form  () . φ . By doing so we obtain the 
consistent estimate of labor input coefficients ( l β ) as well as the estimate of the third order 
polynomial in   and  , which has been denoted as  it i it k it χ . We write the equation as 
( ) it it it k it k i k ,
* φ β α χ + + =       ( A 5 )  
Thus,     () it k it it it k k i * , β χ φ − =         ( A 6 )  
We proceed with the second stage, where we estimate the effect of capital and materials on 
output. Assuming  it ω  follows a first order Markov process, we can rewrite  1 + it ω  as a 
function of  it ω , letting  1 + it ξ  be the innovation in  1 + it ω . Thus  it ω  can be replaced with 
function of  ( it it k i , ) φ  and the equation in the second stage becomes: 
() 1 1 1 1 1 ) ( * * + + + + + + + ⋅ + + = − it it it it k it l it g k c l va η ξ φ β β    (A7) 
Since the functional form of   is not known, we again use the third order polynomial 
expansion (with all interactions) in equation (A7). Since we assume that the capital is known 
in the beginning of the period, and 
() ⋅ g
1 + it ξ is mean independent of all variables known at the 
beginning of the period,  1 + it ξ  is mean independent of  . The consistent coefficient  1 + it k k β  can 
thus be estimated by running non-linear least squares on equation (A7). 
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